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MATTHIAS STADELMANN 
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION  
IN GERMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AFTER 1945 
 
Nineteen seventeen ranks among the most described years of Russian history. 
Irrevocably and in a far-reaching way, the year of the two revolutions saw significant 
upheavals in the state, economy, culture and society in Russia, and mightily influenced 
regions soon coming under the territorial and administrative umbrella of the USSR as well as 
countries outside the Soviet empire. The October Revolution, particularly, was branded as a 
decisive caesura in modern history. How did historiography in Germany analyse Russia’s 
1917? This article traces the paths of post-war West German historiography of the Russian 
revolution and describes the historical preconditions and peculiarities that shaped it.1 
East-German historiography is excluded because it followed the path of Soviet research on 
1917 and was very much engaged in unveiling “bourgeois falsifications”.2 It had no influence 
on West German historiography at all. 
Was (or is) there something like a “national” German historiography and what 
meaning could this characterization have as to research on the Russian Revolution? If we 
define scholarship and research as a process of coming to knowledge and perception by 
methods and theories and the help of sources, there is no space for any national path towards 
cognition as long as we consider that we have reached it through scientific means. However, 
the history of historiography unmasks the notion as illusory, particularly when German 
traditions of history writing are concerned. The question cannot easily be pushed aside, since 
there were strong institutional and personal continuities that bridged the caesura of 1945. 
Many of the historians who either supported the ideology of National Socialism or actively 
took part in the politics of extermination before 1945 were brought into service in West 
German universities. In particular, members of the imperial, “völkisch” and partly racist 
Ostforschung research organisation never broke up their networks and were eager to support 
each other under the conditions of the new democratic order. Historians like Theodor 
                                                                
1This article does not claim to completeness. I am greatly indebted to Stefan Plaggenborg for intense 
discussions, Fabian Wisotzky for valuable organizational help and Ewald Stadelmann for thorough advice in 
translation. 
2Ernst Engelberg, Die deutsche bürgerliche Geschichtsschreibung zur Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution 
(Berlin, 1967); Gerd Vogt, “Die Verfälschung der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution in der neueren 
westdeutschen Literatur”, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 18 (1970): 353-360.  
Schieder, Hermann Aubin, Reinhart Wittram and Werner Markert (just to mention a few 
important names), who backed the ideology and politics of the Nazi regime, became 
professors of Eastern European history at West German universities.3 Only a minority looked 
back in a self-critical way and questioned the historians’ roles and functions in the years 
before 1945. In particular, Werner Philipp, a specialist in the Muscovy period, openly 
addressed problematic chapters of biography, burdened his generation of researchers with the 
blame of not having resisted to ideological demands, and recommended a critical stance on 
the historians’ participation during the Third Reich.4 The majority, however, remained silent 
and tried to avoid any debate about biographies and careers. They tried to cleanse their work 
of now compromising beliefs and phrases, but kept certain elements of their Weltanschauung 
alive, particularly their perception of Bolshevik Russia as a threat to Western civilization 
(which they, ironically, had helped ruin during the years 1933-1945) especially after Soviet 
expansion in Central Europe, and their strong anticommunism. This period in West German 
historiography has been analysed for many years, and there is no need to go into detail here; 
suffice it to say that Ostforschung historians, because of the mainly “völkisch” character of 
their approach, hardly worked on the Russian Revolution as a special topic.5 For a better 
general understanding, one should mention here that professorships and chairs at German 
universities were—and still are—called “for Eastern European History”, which ideally means 
teaching courses covering the entire region and full historical time span. Since 1935, when the 
historian Otto Hoetzsch was forced to leave the chair of Russian History at Humboldt 
University in Berlin, Russianists have found themselves among the other historians 
specialising in Eastern Europe.6 
                                                                
3Winfried Schulze, Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt on the 
Main, 2000); Michael Fahlbusch, Ingo Haar, eds., Handbuch der völkischen Wissenschaften: Personen, 
Institutionen, Forschungsprogramme, Stiftungen (München, 2008). 
4Werner Philipp, “Nationalsozialismus und Ostwissenschaften”, in Universitätstage 1966: Nationalsozialismus 
und die deutsche Universität (Berlin, 1966), 43-62. 
5Fahlbusch, Haar, Handbuch; Gabriele Camphausen, Die wissenschaftliche historische Russlandforschung im 
Dritten Reich, 1933-1945 (Frankfurt on the Main, 1990); Corinna Unger, “‘Objektiv, aber nicht neutral.’ Zur 
Entwicklung der Ostforschung nach 1945”, Osteuropa, 12 (2005): 113-131; Eduard Mühle, “‘Ostforschung.’ 
Beobachtungen zu Aufstieg und Niedergang eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas”, Zeitschrift für 
Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung, 46 (1997): 317-350; from 1952 to 1994 the journal’s name was Zeitschrift für 
Ostforschung; it was edited by Herder Institute in Marburg, the centre of the Ostforscher after 1945. Eduard 
Mühle, Für Volk und deutschen Osten: Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung (Schriften 
des Bundesarchivs 65) (Düsseldorf, 2005); Esther Abel, Kunstraub – Ostforschung – Hochschulkarriere: Der 
Osteuropahistoriker Peter Scheibert (Paderborn, 2016). 
6Erwin Oberländer, ed., Geschichte Osteuropas: Zur Entwicklung einer historischen Disziplin in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz, 1945-1990 (Stuttgart, 1992). 
It is important, however, to keep in mind that German historiography of Eastern 
Europe in general and Russia in particular, needed several years to get rid of the thinking in 
terms of civilizational threat and anticommunism that easily fit into Cold War ideology. 
Therefore, these approaches were not problematic for many years and rather helped integrate 
historians with more or less compromising careers before 1945 into the academic world, 
where the early West German society’s self-understanding facing the communist German 
Democratic Republic as immediate neighbour prevailed. However, the fact that 
historiography in Germany was kept apart from the theoretical and methodological debates 
going on in other parts of the world had much greater effects. One of the central issues in 
German historiography during the 1950s and 1960s was to catch up with methods and 
theoretical frameworks.7  
Interim: the Russian revolution in German historiography  
between 1945 and 1968 
The 1945-1968 period may be regarded as an interim. Historians tried to come to terms 
with the Bolsheviks without falling back on Nazi research paradigms on the one hand and 
without new and alternative research paradigms on the other. It ended with the publication in 
1968 of Dietrich Geyer’s Die Russische Revolution, to be discussed later.  
The problem of the interim literature is best exemplified by Georg von Rauch’s 
History of Bolshevik Russia, published in 1955.8 In the words of Hans von Rimscha, who, 
like von Rauch, was of German-Baltic origin, the book “had to be written, although 
practically it could not”. Von Rimscha referred to the discrepancy between the attempt to 
historicise Bolshevik Russia and the problematic source base in 1955, ten years after the end 
of the Second World War and at the height of the Cold War. Von Rauch shared the general 
problem of Western historians of Russia—he had no access to the necessary source material 
enabling him “to really write a history of the country”. Given the lack of documents, 
numerous conjectures replaced material-based arguments. It is not our aim to discuss whether 
von Rauch’s book fulfilled its promise to be a “history of Bolshevik Russia”. Von Rimscha 
benevolently called it “a reliable, useful and certainly widely welcome guideline to the 
Kremlin’s policy of that time”.9 
                                                                
7Ernst Schulin, ed., Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (1945-1965) (München, 
1989). 
8Georg von Rauch, Geschichte des bolschewistischen Russland (Wiesbaden, 1955). 
9H[ans] v. Rimscha, “Review of Georg von Rauch, Geschichte des bolschewistischen Rußland, Wiesbaden 
1955”, Historische Zeitschrift, 182 (1956): 673-676, quotations 673f., 676. 
For our present purpose, it is important to note von Rauch’s strong emphasis on 
official politics. Social classes or groups and economic developments and problems are 
mentioned only incidentally, if at all. Thus, von Rauch fit into the prevailing historiographic 
paradigms of his time: in the 1950s, history was mainly considered as the history of politics, 
political actors, political institutions and political decisions. These decisions were prepared 
and taken by individuals (no women to be found), so that historic change, generally speaking, 
was mainly linked to statesmen or, as concerns 1917, revolutionaries, their actions and their 
impacts. As a consequence, von Rauch considered that there were two extremist directions 
that divided Russia: on one side, the socialist parties aiming at a system change, on the other, 
nationalist right-wing circles; since the assassination of Prime Minister Stolypin in 1911, the 
latter had exerted greater and greater influence on Tsar Nicholas  II; ideas of “aggressive 
foreign policy” dragged the Russian Empire into the war and to its eventual collapse.  
For von Rauch, a conceivable perspective beyond violent (self-) destruction could have 
been provided by the “forces of the centre”, which “would have steered the State out of the 
confusions of internal misery and external temptations in an evolutionary way”—but these 
anyway not strongly formed forces of the centre were infected and finally disintegrated by 
Pan-Slavic and Great-Russian chauvinistic nationalism.10 In this way, Tsarist Russia was by 
no means doomed to an inevitable fall, as von Rauch strongly emphasized elsewhere: “The 
last 50 years of the Tsarist Empire were not marked by decline, but by rapid evolutionary 
development […].” Only the reckless entrance into the war in 1914 drove Russia into 
destruction by provoking crises which the country could not cope with under the impact of 
greatest tensions.11 
People primarily affected by the crisis of the autocracy did not play a role in von 
Rauch’s argumentation, typically enough he speaks of “Marxism”, “socialism” and of Lenin, 
but hardly about workers, production, and economic and social problems. Demonstrations in 
the streets of Petrograd look marginal in comparison to the heroic deeds of the members of 
the provisional government. For von Rauch, the revolution showed two strongly opposed 
                                                                
10Von Rauch, Geschichte des bolschewistischen Russland, 50. 
11Georg von Rauch, “Betrachtungen zur Frage des Untergangs der russischen Monarchie”, in Hellmuth Rößler, 
ed., Weltwende 1917: Monarchie, Weltrevolution, Demokratie (Göttingen, 1965), 48-64, quotation p. 49. Here 
he further explains: “There is a wide range from the liberation of the peasants with all its deficiencies to 
Stolypin’s agrarian reform with 7 million families on heritable farms; from Alexander’s not realized constitution 
with its advisory people assembly to the state duma with its respectable legislative and polemic achievement 
which gives even to cursory readers of the minutes of the sessions an impression of the level of debates; from the 
rural illiteracy of the 19th century to the progress of the school system on the eve of war which belongs to the 
overall picture of a heyday of cultural life; from the economic backwardness of the 1870s to the level of 
industrialization in 1913, when Russia in textile production ranked second in world economy, and fifth in total 
production […].” 
aspects, on the one hand the insubordinate, illegitimate, murdering and undutiful side, and the 
legitimized by (the last) elections and responsibility-bearing one on the other. It seems as if 
the Baltic-German von Rauch, who was born in Pleskau/Pskov in 1904, indulged in wishful 
thinking about a non-Bolshevik future in Russia instead of analysing the given past. 
Nevertheless, this perspective made him clearly see the usurpation of power by the 
Bolsheviks in October.12 
Von Rauch’s one-sided focus on politics and leadership and positivist approach struck 
critical readers. For example Jesse Clarkson in the American Historical Review in 1957 
criticized not only the “essentially unanalytical narrative of events”, but also the “almost total 
neglect of economic factors”.13 Von Rauch reduced history down to the personalities of 
Aleksandr Kerenskii and Vladimir Lenin, the former as a possible alternative for the future 
leadership of Russia, the latter as a demonic seducer and destroyer, who since April 1917 had 
“each time held his listeners more and more spellbound”; in spite of “a jerky and unmusical” 
manner of speaking and thanks to “primitive demagogic simplifications”, Lenin was said to 
be able to unfold “suggestive power of persuasion” among the workers:  
They were carried along by the enormous willpower of this unusual 
man; the destroying fire of his rhetoric enflamed the masses agitated 
by war and revolt like tinder […]. It was the anarchic instincts of the 
masses that Lenin knew how to stir up.  
In von Rauch’s presentation, the function of these masses in 1917 was limited to being 
“fanaticized” by Lenin and serving as “tools of the irrepressible desire for power”.14  
A little more differentiated was von Rauch’s assessment in his booklet Lenin: The 
Foundation of the Soviet System, published in 1957 (2nd edition 1958) in the series 
“Persönlichkeit und Geschichte [Personality and History]”. Referring to Lev Trotskii, he 
described the October Revolution as “a combination of an organized, carefully prepared 
conspiracy by a minority and a general, but unclear and therefore easily controllable public 
current”. Von Rauch recognized that “the development from May to October had produced 
                                                                
12Von Rauch, Geschichte des bolschewistischen Russland, 91. 
13Jesse D. Clarkson, “Review of Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, New York, 1957”, The 
American Historical Review, 63 (1957): 127-128, quotations p. 128. See also Richard Pipes, “Review of Georg 
von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, New York, 1957”, The Slavic and East European Journal, 3 (1959): 
85-86. 
14Von Rauch, Geschichte des bolschewistischen Russland, 71ff. 
many sympathies for the Bolsheviks within broader circles”. Yet, in this booklet also, the 
personal-political aspect in the shape of Lenin’s character stands clearly in the foreground.15 
This rather detailed presentation of von Rauch’s book aims to show the ways of 
historiography in the interim period and make sense of the critique by Geyer. There were 
other books similar to von Rauch’s, for example Günter Stökl’s Russian History.16 Stökl 
taught at the University of Cologne and specialized in the history of Old Russia. In his book, 
he also emphasised political developments but clearly regarded the actions of Duma members 
with much more restraint than von Rauch. It seems as if the Austrian Stökl had a sharper eye 
in seeing through the political problems of the Russian liberals than the Baltic-German von 
Rauch, who clearly identified with liberal politics after the fall of the monarchy. Although 
Stökl looks considerably more distinctly at the dualism between the provisional government 
and Petrograd Soviet, he agrees with von Rauch about the fate of the February Revolution: the 
victory of the Revolution was to come as soon as the Petrograd garrison mutinied and made 
common cause with the workers. He also principally agreed with von Rauch in the assessment 
of the October events: “It was not the masses of the people [that] were lifted”, but only “the 
party of the Russian communists under Lenin’s leadership”.17  
To conclude this chapter, one should briefly mention Manfred Hellmann’s widely used 
source collection The Russian Revolution 1917, part of the “Dtv-dokumente” series. 
Hellmann taught at Münster University and was a specialist in the medieval history of Eastern 
Europe. His approach was completely marked by the political-personal perspective: the 
February Revolution, the provisional government and the Bolshevik coup were the milestones 
of this source compilation. The empire’s collapse was mainly caused by the deficiencies of 
the imperial couple Nicholas and Alexandra, the intrigues of the court camarilla, and 
government malfunction, mostly due to Prime Minister Goremykin. We learn: statesmen, 
Lenin and Trotskii included, pushed history forward.18  
Positively said, German historiography of 1917 was looking to the future and tried to 
figure out how the Russian Revolution could be understood in a way that was not determined 
by cultural hierarchy, “völkisch” superiority and racial inferiority. That made politics, 
personalities and power come to the foreground. Negatively said, German historians of 1917 
                                                                
15Georg von Rauch, Lenin: Die Grundlegung des Sowjetsystems (Göttingen ²1958), 64. 
16Günter Stökl, Russische Geschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1962). 
17Stökl, Russische Geschichte, 650. 
18Manfred Hellmann, ed., Die russische Revolution 1917: Von der Abdankung des Zaren bis zum Staatsstreich 
der Bolschewiki (München, 1964), introduction by the editor (7-40). 
had dramatically lost contact with historiography outside Germany, they were not at all able 
to come to terms with a complex phenomenon like the Russian Revolution because they had 
no idea of how to study a revolution that went beyond their categorical understanding of 
history; they neither had the intellectual sensorium nor the methodological instruments for it. 
One had to wait until the end of the 1960s, when the social approach opened the doors for 
new perceptions. This approach was mostly adopted by the younger generation of historians, 
who had no scholarly roots in Nazi Germany. However, ironically or not, historians who were 
very much sympathetic with Nazi ideology and more or less openly anti-Semitic had paved 
the way for this turn. Werner Conze became one of the protagonists of social history in the 
German Federal Republic. There was also oscillating Peter Scheibert (see below), who built 
up a group of young historians at Marburg University that came to publish books on the social 
history of Soviet Russia. Some historians burdened with active participation in the National 
Socialist regime and politics very quickly adapted to varieties of social history. 
New beginnings in the late 1960s 
If 1917 was a caesura in Russian history, the 1970s were a turning point in German 
historiography of 1917. The new orientation was partly generational, partly a question of 
methodological and theoretical information. It took more than 20 years since 1945 and the 
coming of the 50th anniversary of Russia’s 1917 until a book was published that may be 
regarded as a new beginning in German historiography on 1917. Dietrich Geyer’s The 
Russian Revolution: Historical Problems and Perspectives19 was the starting point for 
descriptions and interpretations of 1917 in the following years, i.e., prudent and thoughtful, 
methodologically well informed, theoretically safely grounded studies, but with a remarkable 
lack of archival sources. Or, to bring it to the point, intelligent interpretations that had to rely 
on sources provided by Soviet colleagues or could be found in Western, mostly American, 
institutions. As the book’s title indicates, Geyer’s aim was not a coherent empirical 
description of the revolutionary events, but an introduction to “modern historical research”20 
that based scholarly expertise on methods and particularly on theoretical categories that 
helped make the Russian Revolution part of history rather than of political intentions and 
civilizational problems. His book tried to leave behind the inappropriate descriptions by 
German historians before him and schematic and distorting Marxist interpretations from the 
Soviet side. He criticized former historiography with rhetorical pungency, giving a description 
of its errors and deficiencies:  
                                                                
19Dietrich Geyer, Die Russische Revolution: Historische Probleme und Perspektiven (Göttingen4, 1977; first 
edition Stuttgart, etc., 1968). 
20Geyer, Die Russische Revolution, 8. 
Meanwhile there are indicators that historical research is getting 
realigned, that historians try to consider causes and developments 
leading to the revolution in a new and more sober way without 
temptations to regard problems ideologically instead of uncovering 
them. Old positions are given up, old formulations verified. What 
promises new insights and scholarly respect does not run after scandal 
and secret-service stories which accompanied the Russian Revolution 
as well; it does not limit itself to bio-psychological analyses as was 
shown recently by exalted endeavours to uncover the secret roots of 
revolution in Lenin’s sexual life and the frustration of the 
revolutionaries.21  
A professor of Eastern European History in Tübingen, Geyer gave a lecture series in 
1967 on the Russian Revolution that became the basis of his book. Five out of the book’s 
eleven chapters deal with the preconditions of the Revolution, i.e., the structures and 
processes of the Russian Empire and its end. Geyer was sceptical about the Tsarist Empire’s 
successful adaptation to the growing problems of the early 20th century. Thus, he abandoned 
the view that a partially reformed system, which à la longue had good perspectives to develop, 
was drawn into the abyss by the personal failure of the elite at court in a time of extreme 
tensions during the war. The option of a Russian constitutional monarchy having had a chance 
if the First World War had not taken place was no question for him but rather why “the old 
regime, which had lost its broad social basis long ago, continued to exist and was able to 
control revolutionary danger over the decades preceding the war”.22 Concomitantly, he 
rejected “that rigid historical determinism which was blasted to us from the east: revolution as 
a mere necessity, as the quintessence of the historical process”.23 In particular, he focused on 
socio-economic problems, which today does not seem noteworthy at all, but at the time, this 
approach was novel in German historiography of the Russian Revolution. The agrarian 
question, misery in the countryside, which after Stolypin’s reforms was at best in a stage of 
change, but had not entered a phase of general prosperity, and the workers’ question were the 
decisive challenges for Russia’s autocracy. Above all, the workers’ discontent, backed by the 
                                                                
21Ibid., 17. 
22Ibid, 32. Also the Hamburg historian Klaus Detlev Grothusen emphasized in a lecture series in Münster, 
published in 1969, that “the overthrow of the tsarist regime […] was the result of internal crises that had been 
smouldering for decades”. Klaus Detlev Grothusen, “Von der Februarrevolution zur Oktoberrevolution: Die Zeit 
der Provisorischen Regierung”, Die Russischen Revolutionen von 1917. Eine Vorlesungsreihe (Wiesbaden 
[Schriften der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung der Universität Münster], 1969), 3-17, quotation p. 4. 
23Geyer, Die Russische Revolution, the following quotations always according to the fourth edition, unchanged 
in the main text, 17. 
political intelligentsia, along with grown proletarian organizational capability strongly 
undermined the authority of the autocratic state, even though the industrial proletariat carried 
less weight in quantity than the peasant majority.  
While explicitly turning against the reduction “of the history of revolution to a 
personal issue”,24 thus rejecting the interpretation of the revolution’s pre-history as a personal 
failure of the last tsar, Geyer considered social problems, the gap between state and society, 
the destructive powers of war and the breakdown of liberal-bourgeois alternatives in summer 
1917 as the conditions for the future Bolshevik victory. However desolate and desperate the 
state of the governmental rump may be described, still the Bolshevik takeover in October was 
“the result of a violent action aiming for the downfall of the provisional government”.25 But 
the military success of the October coup was due to the political victory the Bolsheviks had 
gained before when they won the soviets as organs of revolutionary democracy. In a way, the 
coup was legitimized by Petrograd democracy. 
In the same provocative way, Geyer confronted his elder colleagues with the notion 
that the October revolutionaries stayed in power not only through brutal terror, but because 
the “secret of their success” was above all skilful politics with “plebiscitary quality”. The 
Bolsheviks implemented what the people wanted and “since February 1917, in their 
manifestos and programs, the parties of soviet-based democracy” only “had paraded 
around”.26 
Geyer also emphasized the Bolsheviks’ practical lack of planning after coming to 
power: “The Bolshevik party was only to a limited extent the directing force.” They let 
themselves be drifted by the interests of the lower classes, the satisfaction of whose wishes 
they had inscribed on their banners. In addition, their own experience and skills were poorly 
developed. Thus, the tolerance for “anarchic mass activity” turned out to be essential for the 
consolidation of Bolshevik power. Yet, the party soon began to rally and concentrate its 
forces into substantial power structures. This was accompanied by a “shift from making 
politics based on soviet democracy to politics decided on by the Bolshevik party”, in other 
words: the soviets were confined to administrative and later acclamatory functions. The brief 
democratization by soviets was rapidly transformed into a bureaucratic system of rule which 
later became Stalin’s educational dictatorship.27 Geyer regarded the Bolsheviks’ rigid policy 
                                                                
24Ibid., 64. 
25Ibid., 93. 
26Ibid., 107-117, quotation, 116f. 
27Ibid., 118-129, quotations, 120ff. 
as the only way to maintain power under the specific conditions of post-revolutionary months; 
otherwise, they would have lost power right away to—internal or external—opponents.28 
In his conclusion, Geyer made a very broad and—if we look at the 100th anniversary of 
the year 1917—still relevant statement presenting the revolution in a global perspective:  
Those who do not want to give an account of the events, but to find 
principles and judgements, will have to ask for the meanings of this 
revolution for today’s world history. 
At this stage of discussion, Geyer finally opened his methodological and theoretical 
canteen. Looking for “historical processes and structures which, in essence, have a long 
duration”, he made clear that he was talking of a “gradual evolution of universal 
modernization”. His approach limited the relevance of events in favour of the overriding 
issue, “industrialization and modernization of a backward, retarded agricultural country”, 
which for him was an “absolute priority” for Russian politics between 1890 and 1930. One 
may conclude that his structural-historical view declares the tsarist ministers Witte and 
Stolypin and the “Stalinist planning commissars” to share the same objective, achieving 
modernization of Russia and having the country meet the standards of the time. The Russian 
October Revolution thus was part of a comprehensive large-scale “modern world 
revolution”—and as such, 1917 displays potential as a turning point as a “new category of 
revolution […]: a way of changing the world, created at first in Russia, according to designs 
for the future programmed by elitist small groups”.29 
Seen from today’s perspective, the novelty of this approach to the Russian Revolution 
is somewhat relative, since Geyer was not at all the only one who was an adherent of 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft [history as a social science], the paradigm that started to 
dominate German historiography in general in the 1960s.30 It is widely known by its 
“Bielefeld school” label, the German history experts Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka 
                                                                
28Ibid., 124f. 
29Ibid., 130-141, quotations, 130, 135ff., 140. The process of relativisation of the legend about the Bolshevik 
clique meticulously planning everything was started by Walter Pietsch in 1969, who underlined pragmatism, 
improvisation and chaos in the establishment of Bolshevik power from 1917 on. See his study Revolution und 
Staat: Institutionen als Träger der Macht in Sowjetrussland 1917-1922, (Cologne [Abhandlungen des 
Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien 20], 1969).  
30Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Geschichte und Soziologie (Cologne, 1972); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Geschichte 
und Ökonomie (Cologne, 1973); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Historische Sozialwissenschaft und 
Geschichtsschreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, 
1980). 
being its main protagonists; the newly founded (1975) journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft 
[History and Society] was its mouthpiece. It focused on economy, interests, social classes and 
their roles, on society, institutions and general structures, and considered any notion that 
“great men make history”, any personalised history and ideology as a force of development 
and historical action as elements of an obsolete historiography. Sociology became the mother 
of historiography, Max Weber the theoretical sun in the sky of structuralism, and 
modernization theory the analytical basis of interpretation.31 Surely this kind of 
depersonalized and anonymous, de-ideologized and spiritless (not to be understood as 
uninspired) historiography regarding structures as historical actors allowing to strictly 
objectify historical processes was a reaction to the recent past in German historiography. As 
to research strategies, the social science turn was absolutely necessary to overcome the 
remnants of Ostforschung and all sorts of eccentric, often synonymously anti-communist 
“Sovietology” that blossomed during the Cold War era. It was also necessary to catch up with 
historiography outside Germany. The late 1950s and 1960s became years of intense debates 
over how to write history. One must place Geyer’s book on the Russian Revolution within 
this context to understand its relevance and meaning. 
Severe critique of Geyer’s comprehensive description of Bolshevik power came as no 
surprise. Decades later, Heinz Brahm, then scientific director of the Bundesinstitut für 
ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Federal Institute for Eastern [i. e., Eastern 
Europe, Caucasus, Middle Asia and China – M.S.] and international studies) in Cologne, still 
called him “Lenin’s determined body guard”, a reproach that Geyer rejected and that was a 
late echo of an outlived historiography.32 It is interesting to know that the Institute was 
founded in 1961 under the name Institut zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus 
[Institute for the study of Marxism-Leninism]; it stood under the administrative auspices of 
the Ministry of Interior and was designed as a think-tank to advise the federal government of 
the German Federal Republic. Yet it is beyond doubt that Geyer’s interpretation of the 
Russian Revolution also corresponded to the political climate in West Germany in the late 
1960s, particularly in universities. In an interview in 2005, Geyer himself commented on his 
book:  
It was the spirit of the time that stimulated me. […] What I found 
particularly exciting and impressive was the global worldwide 
framework of revolutionary thinking, the fact that proletarian 
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revolution, agrarian revolution, anticolonial and anti-imperialistic 
revolution were merged by Lenin. 
It was not only Geyer who was impressed by the revolutionary mood of the time, but 
also the majority of students. For this “fucking liberal” [Scheißliberaler], in the jargon of that 
rebellious time, the leftist spirit of German universities offered a proper embedding for his 
scepticism about the primitive and superficial anti-communism of an ideologized 
historiography.33 While he would have been politically and academically hanged in the mid-
1950s, as the chapter on the interim period shows, the students’ movement in the late 1960s, 
with its antifascist implications, strongly supported his new interpretations. It should be noted 
that the Historische Sozialwissenschaft approach was continued by historians of the Tübingen 
institute such as Manfred Hildermeier, Dietrich Beyrau, and Bernd Bonwetsch, whose studies 
on the Russian revolution will be reviewed below. 
Pluralism in social history studies 
During the 1970s, many Russianists dealing with the modern history of the Russian 
Empire focused either on the pre- or post-revolutionary period. Some focused on long-term 
causes leading to 1917 and studied intensely but without historical teleology the ambivalent 
modernisation of tsarist Russia and its contradictory results, others were interested in what 
followed after October without historical teleology leading to Stalinism. The emerging 
pluralism of studies methodologically based on the social history paradigm concentrated at 
certain universities where professors were able to build up groups of young researchers—
today one would call them graduate schools—who studied within the “research programme” 
of that particular department.  
The above mentioned Peter Scheibert, who “in his former life” was a member of the 
Waffen-SS and participated in the art and archival document “protection” campaigns, i.e., 
robbery and elimination of the culture of “inferior peoples” in Eastern Europe during the 
Second World War,34 and who unsuccessfully attempted to write a sort of three-volume 
intellectual history of the revolution from Bakunin to Lenin, of which only one was 
published,35 gathered young historians around him who studied the first years after the 
revolution. Located at Marburg University, the group left “Sovietology” behind and opened 
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34Abel, Kunstraub. 
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new fields of research by looking at the social developments, economic change and 
institutional patterns of the new Soviet state. Such a research programme had a certain 
intellectual precondition. It accepted the Bolshevik takeover and the communists’ power not 
in terms of ideology and brutal violence, but as a fact that had to be studied in all its facets. 
Until the middle of the 1970’s, several dissertations opened insights into the inner history of 
Soviet state and society. Uwe Brügmann studied the role of trade-unions and the hot debate 
about the theory of “étatisation”,36 Heiko Haumann, the beginning of economic planning, 
electrification and the GOELRO utopia,37 Gert Meyer, the turn from war communism to NEP 
and the relationship between town and countryside,38 and Richard Lorenz, the socio-economic 
developments between the revolution and Stalin’s era (discussed below).39 Peter Scheibert, 
who eagerly tried to hide his career before 1945 from public discussion, certainly was not 
amused when he learned that all these young historians became leftists. 
This group was not one of its kind. Like mushrooms after a warm rain, during the 
1970s dissertations dealt with issues related to the revolution and more particularly its 
consequences. New chairs in Eastern European History were created, and more or less young 
scholars had a chance to build up a new Soviet history. In 1969, Walter Pietsch published his 
Revolution and State, which turned Lenin’s State and Revolution upside down; the book may 
be regarded as the then fundamental study of organisational and institutional developments 
during and after the revolution.40 He wrote his dissertation at Freiburg University, where 
Gottfried Schramm, who had been Scheibert’s assistant in Marburg, gathered young historians 
around him in order to work on the third volume of the Handbook of Russian History, which 
covered the 1856-1945 period.41 Heiko Haumann found a fruitful asylum in Freiburg after 
Scheibert had severely tried to control his teaching and further studies. This incident (and the 
one concerning Richard Lorenz to be discussed below) showed that obsolete ideological 
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37Heiko Haumann, Beginn der Planwirtschaft: Elektrifizierung, Wirtschaftsplanung und gesellschaftliche 
Entwicklung Sowjetrußlands 1917-1921 (Düsseldorf, 1974). 
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40Pietsch, Revolution und Staat. 
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1856-1945: Von den autokratischen Reformen zum Sowjetstaat. 
questions still were “in the air” and could have serious effects on young scholars if their 
research displeased their professors. In the tolerant atmosphere of Freiburg University, 
Haumann wrote his Capitalism in Russia during the First World War, in which he tried to 
determine the state of development of capitalism, its structural patterns and the socio-political 
roles of entrepreneurs and their organisations during the final stage of autocracy.42 Of course, 
this publication was an answer to Lenin’s views on capitalism. 
The blossoming of Soviet studies at several universities revealed the leading role of 
social history. These studies considerably widened the empirical knowledge of social and 
economic developments in Soviet Russia and drove political history to the background. 
Politics mattered in relationship with economics and social developments in 
Helga Schuler-Jung’s Economy and Politics in Soviet Russia, 1920-1924, in which she 
focused on the debates on economic alternatives and their impacts on political and personal 
changes in the Bolshevik party and state organs.43 The publications of the 1970s and early 
1980s reflected the lively pluralism of social history studies. One should not forget to mention 
that some of the dissertations of that period were fundamental and have remained so to this 
day, as for example Hans-Henning Schröder’s social history of the Bolshevik Party.44 
Schröder’s detailed description of membership, social origin, education, inner-party social 
mobility (vydvizhentsy) and in particular the relationship between General Secretary Stalin 
and incomers was path-breaking for the understanding of Stalin’s way to power. 
Richard Lorenz deserves short special consideration. He studied philosophy in Leipzig 
and became the assistant of the philosopher Ernst Bloch. After he left the German Democratic 
Republic in 1957, he studied sociology and psychology and started working at the famous 
Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt on the Main. Under the supervision of Scheibert, he 
wrote his doctoral dissertation on “The beginnings of Bolshevik industrial policy”. In 
Marburg, he started working on his Habilitation. The book was finally published in 1976, but 
the qualification to get a professorship was denied by Scheibert because of “serious concerns” 
as to the quality of the study he had strongly supported before because of its innovative 
character. One can hardly oversee the political aspects of the conflict, since Marburg 
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University at that time was called “red Marburg”, and Scheibert certainly did not belong to 
this wing while Lorenz did.45 
In his Social History of the Soviet Union, Lorenz analysed 1917 exclusively from a 
socio-economic point of view:  
The […] presentation focuses on the development of production 
conditions, which at the same time are connected with relations of 
power and dependence. Political institutions are dealt with only in so 
far as it is necessary for the understanding of socioeconomic 
processes. 
He decidedly opposed the “traditional historiography of Russia, interested mainly in 
the expansion of power”, but also “recent theories of development” in terms of a “global 
process of modernization”. No doubt, Lorenz was strongly influenced by Marxism. For him, 
the fate of socialist Russia lay in the relationship between peasants and workers.46 
The conception and vocabulary of the text disclose a Marxist understanding of history, 
with the conviction of no alternative to Bolshevik revolution. The study often appears as a 
variant of Soviet publications ideologically brought into line, yet with a certain educated 
mildness and professorial serenity, without overwhelming exultation about the Bolsheviks’ 
liberation of mankind, but with an unshaken conviction of its necessity. The revolutions of 
1905-1907, February and October 1917 constituted “a consistent process, which ran out from 
the same social powers, mainly the proletariat and the peasantry, and from the start was 
characterised by outlines of anti-capitalism”. The Bolsheviks placed themselves at the top of 
the revolutionary mass movement; they came to power because they were the only ones who 
were able to combine the features of democracy with socialist goals.47 The bourgeoisie and 
the liberals in general played no historically significant role. To sum it up: the Bolsheviks 
became the only socio-political alternative during 1917; Lenin opened the eyes of the people 
on the errors and deficiencies of the provisional government and on October 25th, the congress 
of soviets “decided the transformation of Russia into a Soviet Republic”.48 Lorenz brought a 
new quality to West-German historiography of the Russian Revolution, and this in two 
respects: on the one hand, with a consistent Marxist-inspired social and economic approach 
focusing on just a few historical figures and conceiving political groups as very static entities, 
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and based on a broad economic material basis; on the other hand, with a learned, but 
undisguised retelling of the Bolshevik narrative, though in a West European 
structural-historical design.49 
Other historians focused on the pre-revolutionary era and rarely on the revolutionary 
process itself. In 1983, Gottfried Schramm summed up the state of research in the third 
volume of the monumental Handbook of Russian History.50 In contrast to the tendency of 
social and structural historiography, the Freiburg historian considered that the Russian Empire 
was by no means doomed to a downfall since the cohesion of the liberal society, 
self-administration and will to reform had not fully blown up. Notwithstanding all the 
pressures, Russia did not collapse during the war; additionally, the military situation was not 
as bad as it was willingly circulated to be. It was fatal for the monarchy that during the 
February turmoil no reliable army units were left in Petrograd. Schramm suggested that a 
liberal alternative would have been possible if enormous errors had not been made by the 
rulers out of unrealistic isolation such as the refusal to make prompt and adequate concessions 
and indecisiveness with regards to the capital. 
Such an interpretation was disputable, but it was undeniably based on a fine study of 
the literature and a broad knowledge of sources. Other publications focusing on pre-
revolutionary history were not as judicious, e.g. Bernd Bonwetsch’s History of the Russian 
Revolution, qualified by its subtitle as a “social history from the peasant emancipation to the 
October coup”. The author, a specialist in the history of Russia during the world wars, 
described pre-revolutionary developments rather schematically, and he had quite a special 
sense of proportion when he concluded:  
It is true; the estates of the nobility were eliminated, so were to a large 
extent those of the bourgeoisie. But as concerns the situation and 
disposition of the big mass of the population in the countryside, in the 
factories or in the city which emptied itself for a couple of years, in 
principle only Stalin’s revolution from above brought real changes. In 
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the perspective of social history, top and bottom remained to a large 
extent as they were before the revolution. 
As far as politics are concerned, however, the October Revolution meant the “greatest 
rupture in Russian history”.51 
The year 1917 got a little out of sight, but in 1989 Manfred Hildermeier started a 
large-scale synthesis—in terms of the time frame of the Russian Revolution, from 1905 to 
1921, and his use of various explanatory methods. Hildermeier was inspired by the approach 
of structural history especially for the year 1917. Yet he also stands in the tradition of Geyer 
insofar as he belongs to those social historians who neither followed a “natural” materialistic 
determinism nor entirely disregarded personal factors. Notwithstanding the imprint of 
structural history on him, Hildermeier retained independent openness for multiple 
perspectives. In this way, the Revolution to him was a long-term, structurally justified and in 
its concreteness a spontaneously uprising issue as well. Two requirements “prepared the 
ground for the secular upheaval of 1917 […]: the crisis of the old regime and the world 
war”.52  
Hildermeier identified four essential crisis areas in the Russian Empire at the 
beginning of the 20th century:  
1. the structural crisis of the agricultural sector, where the liberation of the peasants in 
1861 created more problems than it solved;  
2. the worker question, with the emergence of a rapidly growing, easily “politcizable” 
new underclass in densely populated cities;  
3. the intelligentsia forced into opposition to the state;  
4. the crisis of state power, where Hildermeier wants to position himself in a 
differentiating way between two historiographic poles—confidence in reformability and the 
inevitability of the breakdown.  
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Against the background of these crisis areas, the First World War led to the 
overburdening of Russian autocracy which, “isolated by petrification and political blindness” 
in the end was unable to summon defenders.53  
For Hildermeier, the military was decisive for the success of the revolution in two 
respects. Firstly, he points to the massive desertion of Petrograd soldiers, which “stroke the 
fatal blow to the old regime”. The survival of the revolution during the first turbulent days and 
even hours was above all guaranteed by the Russian military leadership. “The arrangement 
between the army leadership and the Duma—and this has been too little recognized so far—
was decisive for the triumph […].” The Revolution could still be stopped, but the military was 
less interested in a blood bath in the capital than in law and order in the rest of the country. 
“The general staff was ready to sacrifice the old regime for the overall aim of maintaining the 
national defence capability and to make arrangements with the Duma.”54 
Although the structural deficits that caused the collapse of the system when it came 
under pressure are at the centre of explanations, in Hildermeier’s description of the 
developments of 1917, basically structural historical principles remain compatible with 
political and personal historical approaches. It is the interaction between structures and action, 
between Russia’s massive problems in 1917 and political mistakes that left the democratic 
government of February no chance at all.55 Similar observations can be made about October: 
“Power was lying on the street and the February Government watched spellbound as the 
Bolsheviks picked it up, before everyone’s eyes.” Of course, a structural-historical 
explanation of the October Revolution cannot boil down to “mere seduction by a fanatic 
intelligentsia”. Yet Hildermeier has no problem accepting the “immense importance of 
Lenin’s personality”. Later, he also included Trotskii in his perspective and summed up the 
essential elements of his interpretation of 1917 in one sentence: “Without understating 
external pressures, structural problems and the provisional government’s serious mistakes 
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[…]: No doubt, here ‘men made history’.”56 Of course, they could only make history, as is 
implied in Hildermeier’s more than 300 pages, because longer-term structures and short-term 
processes allowed them to. 
Culture, periphery, nations 
There is no doubt that the historiography of Russia’s 1917 produced in the 1970s 
overcame all the restraints mentioned in the second part of this article. The new generation of 
historians—the age cohort of the 1940s57—played a major role. Its members reached full 
professorships and were able to establish research that was based on sources, methods, 
theoretical frameworks; they communicated with their colleagues in the Soviet Union and in 
the West. In the German Federal Republic, more and more professorships for Eastern 
European History were established. A certain Cold-War effect did play a role, although minor 
and one among many, since the scope of research went beyond contemporary history and the 
history of communist Eastern Europe. The enlargement of the institutional basis certainly 
helped increase the quantity of young scholars working in the field of Russian history. 
Research became pluralistic as to approaches, topics, theoretical backgrounds, perspectives 
and interpretations. Step by step, the social history paradigm lost its dominant role. 
One can hardly speak of a cultural “turn” in the 1980s, but there is no doubt that 
culture mattered more and more. Certainly, cultural studies of the Russian Revolution had 
already begun in the 1970s simultaneously with the studies mentioned here. The 
aforementioned Schramm group working on the third volume of the Handbook of Russian 
History indeed placed culture at the end of the chapter on 1917, but its role was not at all 
denied since several scholars had begun to study it.58 When in 1983 Gernot Erler summed up 
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the results of this field in German and international research, one could not oversee the 
meaning and growing role of cultural studies on the Russian revolution including topics of 
daily life, women and abandoned children.59 
Within these cultural studies, a certain tendency may be observed that did not, for that 
matter, reduce the existing pluralism. Historians looked at cultural and ideological alternatives 
to Leninist and official cultural policy. Proletkult became one of the main fields of research, 
and Aleksandr Bogdanov, one of the Proletkult thinkers, the theoretician of epistemology, 
system-theory, culture theory, whom Lenin chose as one of his most dangerous enemies in 
1909-1910, was studied intensely.60 Again, the aforementioned Richard Lorenz was at the 
forefront, this time the cultural one, when in 1969 he edited documents on the proletarian 
cultural revolution.61  
And there was the Anti-Lorenz. Scheibert’s opus magnum Lenin in Power was 
published in 1984.62 The author had spent almost 20 years on the manuscript. In the end, the 
700-page book evoked a slip box turned upside down, with its huge amount of partly 
unpublished sources—newspapers, journals from all over Soviet Russia, even rare provincial 
ones, private notes—mainly from American libraries. Scheibert claimed “to analyse the 
relationship between economic [or] social practical constraints and Lenin’s or the party elite’s 
margins of decision”,63 but he became extremely frustrated by his topic, as he wrote in a letter 
to a colleague: “Meanwhile I doubt more and more that the plain banality of this so-called 
revolution actually deserves description.” He painfully noticed that he had spent many years 
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on a topic “without being able to identify myself with any of the protagonists in one way or 
another”.64  
His book was unique at the time. The amount of sources, his intention to focus on the 
fates of individuals as far as they appeared in the sources, to describe “social reality […] as it 
was and not as it should be”, his approach consisting in looking at “the experiences of the 
contemporaries” and declaring “the principles of simple humanity” as his methodological 
basis were not at all common at the time. He described situations in cities and in the 
countryside, scenes of terror and famine, disputes within committees, the work of the 
trade-unions and many more situations and occurrences, thus creating a colourful mosaic of 
loosely connected incidents and observations. One might call his book a micro-history or 
daily-life history of the revolution though it certainly could not satisfy either methodological 
purists of Alltagsgeschichte (daily-life history) and micro-history or other historians, whose 
majority had difficulties finding an appropriate approach at all.65  
Strangely enough, the book was published by a publisher specialising in chemistry and 
got no applause at all. The reviews were as bizarre as the book and very German insofar as 
they mainly focused on questions of methods and sources, but hesitated to evaluate 
Scheibert’s “scenes of power” (as the book should have been entitled) as the extreme dark 
side of the revolution. To put the finger in the physical and mental wounds of the 
contemporaries of the revolution and civil war was not the most appreciated approach during 
the—with some exaggeration—“Marxist” years of Soviet studies. 
Although there is a lot to be said against Scheibert’s book, it nonetheless opened two 
fields of research that were still to come. His book may be regarded as a precursor of the 
history of violence during and after the Russian revolution.66 Scheibert became the Melgunov 
of the 1980s.67 Of course, descriptions of this specific aspect of Bolshevik power could hardly 
be expected from Lorenz or other leftists. Additionally, the book unintentionally helped orient 
research to the revolution outside the capitals.  
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In retrospective, two remarks must be made: Firstly, Scheibert’s book had an original 
anti-Marxist reflex directed against the mainstream historiography of the Russian revolution 
(as he saw it), in particular against “Red Marburg” and the “red” historians of his own group 
of scholars; secondly, the book was a strange rehabilitation of the Russian people by a 
historian who as a member of special Nazi forces once had robbed the materials he later 
eagerly wanted to study on behalf of “humanity”. 
Let us come back to the developments in historiography. Not surprisingly, studies on 
the Russian periphery soon appeared with Scheibert again at the forefront.68 Research in this 
field showed different developments, forces and constellations for turnover from those in 
Petrograd or Moscow. The liberal alternative became much more realistic than in the centres 
of the revolution.69 The “white” movement was studied in detail.70 Not surprisingly either, 
research discovered the uprising of nationalities. The research on 1917 and its aftermath 
became more and more multi-perspective; it questioned the “Russian” exclusivity of the 
revolution. Helmut Altrichter’s monography on the revolution reserved a long chapter on the 
emancipation of nationalities from Russian rule.71 The author’s general approach consists in a 
“political, social and cultural description” presenting the revolution as a “most complex 
context” that “resists simple attempts of explanation and can be understood only out of its 
time”.72 In so doing, Altrichter pays special attention to the multidimensional character of 
preconditions, events and perceptions: from the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous” in the 
late tsarist empire to the “heterogeneity of acting groups and their guiding principles”, to the 
“tensions between centre and periphery”.73  
In its content, Altrichter’s presentation is compatible with the principles of 
German-speaking historiography of 1917 as they appear in Geyer and Hildermeier, his heart 
beats for social history: consideration of the different “acting groups” of the revolution 
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quickly leads to the “limits of the historical explanatory power” of the government-centred 
narrative. Here, Altrichter pursues a new conceptualization in the historiographical 
description of 1917 by looking at the different social groups of the revolution—workers, 
soldiers, peasants and bourgeois—in a systematic classification within a chronological 
framework from the end of 1916 to the end of 1917.74 The benefits of Altrichter’s synthetic 
approach lie not least in his successful endeavour to come as close as possible to the different 
realities of 1917, which existed side by side and sometimes were intertwined. Of course, 
everything has its price: the readers pay for novel vividness with the waiver of pointed and 
easily memorable theses—in the overall view, 1917 was just too complex, which seems to be 
confirmed by Altrichter’s avoidance of an all-encompassing final chapter.75 
In his introduction, Altrichter raises the question whether the keys to “a new synthesis 
of the histories of ideas, politics and society” are to be found in the “development from social 
to ‘cultural history’, which questions previous terms, understands societal utterances and 
behaviour as well as language and culture as a system of discourse, and tries to decode 
them”.76 Indeed, cultural studies conducted mostly by a new age-cohort of historians 
continued with various approaches and topics, some of them mainly referring not to the year 
1917, but to the time after the Bolshevik seizure of power.77 The latest monograph on the 
Russian Revolution, published in 2001, which turned out to be a history of the Soviet Union 
between 1917 and the early 1930s, could therefore rely on a solid basis of cultural studies. 
This becomes clear when the author talks about changes in “public space” in Petrograd or, in 
an Alltagsgeschichte perspective, about the kommunalka, the Soviet type of shared residence, 
which came into being by “redistribution of municipal living space”. Likewise, the author’s 
emphasis on “moods”, “stereotypes” or representations that were decisive in the 
self-positioning of workers and soldiers, and recognition that the sharp opposition of Russia’s 
lower classes to the provisional government rested just as much on certain ways of perception, 
indicate that cultural history concepts can, too, be used fruitfully in the study of the 1917 
Revolution. The radical rejection of the “bourgeois” ministers by a growing majority of 
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workers often had its reason less in concrete political differences than in mental hostility 
towards the declared “class enemy”.78 
*** 
The last book on the Russian revolution mentioned here indicates a certain slowdown 
in research in comparison to previous years. Probably there will be little contradiction when 
the situation nowadays is described as follows: research about 1917 has stopped being 
eruptive and path-breaking; the caravan of historians has pushed along to Stalinism and 
recently from there to post-Stalinism; the Revolution has become a subject of 
jubilee-publications.79 There is little hope (and little reason) for a new wave of research on 
1917, there is even less hope that in 2017 the expected quantity of publications about 1917 
will offer an appropriate quality of new insights. That is not a problem inherent to German 
historiography alone but an indicator of research normality, research conjunctures and market 
mechanisms. At least the latter are not known for producing fine research. Today, one can 
hardly identify a direction in the historiography of 1917. The question of how research on 
1917 could produce new insights has nothing to do with “German” historiography any longer. 
The answer could be given by a comparative historical analysis of Soviet Russian 
developments as part of the newly erected authoritarian post-war regimes after 1917-1918, 
modern Turkey and fascist Italy included.80 It would help perceive phenomena and 
dimensions, for example, of party rule, physical violence, ideologies, law (or lack thereof), 
personality cult and religious policies as general problems of the period with a common basis 
in history and not in the peculiar societies and “national” preconditions of development alone, 
according to the tasks of comparative historical research originally put up by Marc Bloch.81 
Questions of mental, cultural and habitual longue durée stretching from tsarist to Soviet 
Russia also deserve to be considered in more detail. Such an approach would have both to 
accept and overcome 1917 as a turning point by tracing traditions and legacies of the 
pre-revolutionary period in Soviet political and societal behaviour. What is to be done should 
be tackled by international research and discussion. 
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